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LOUISIANA AND THE COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT ACT IN THE WAKE OF
HURRICANE KATRINA:  A RENEWED ADVOCACY
FOR A MORE AGGRESSIVE USE OF THE




With the passage of the Coastal Zone Management Act1 (CZMA or
Act) in 1972, Congress sought to protect the Nation’s dwindling coastal
resources.  The Act has been reauthorized several times since, and despite
opposition from the Reagan and Bush administrations, it has managed to
only be strengthened in its more than thirty years of existence.  Ninety-nine
percent of the United States coastline is now protected by a state program
approved under the Act.  Given that each state is responsible for adminis-
tering its own coastal zone management program, much variety in the
effectiveness of these programs has emerged.  In the continuing wake of
Hurricane Katrina, as mistakes are pondered and solutions proposed,
Louisiana’s less than effective use of the Act serves as a useful entry point
into an examination of what has gone wrong in protecting Louisiana’s
fragile coastline.  Louisiana has the most remaining wetlands in the United
States and generates a significant portion of the country’s commercial
fishery output.  Concurrently, the state is losing more wetlands than any-
where in the country and is in danger of sacrificing its vital fishing industry
to shortsighted energy development interests.
This Comment seeks to establish that an honest, more aggressive use of
the federal consistency provision would more effectively protect
Louisiana’s coastal resources.  This Comment first examines the origin and
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2. Lieutenant Patrick J. Gibbons, Too Much of a Good Thing? Federal Supremacy &
The Devolution of Regulatory Power: The Case of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 48
NAVAL L. REV. 84, 87 (2001).  
3. Id. at 88.
4. Report of the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, Our
evolution of the CZMA to illustrate that the Act has been, and will continue
to be, an important factor in the management of coastal resources.    The
fact that Congress has reauthorized and strengthened the Act several times
suggests as much.  Furthermore, some states have used the Act in a
powerful manner to trump what would otherwise be strong federal interests.
Included within this section of the Comment are brief analyses of the Act’s
reauthorizations, as well as how states develop their individual coastal
management plans.  Second, the Comment briefly details Louisiana’s use
of the CZMA and of its coastal resources, to facilitate an understanding of
how the state arrived at its current position.  The state has not been as
aggressive with its powers under the Act as it could be—the dearth of
existing case law suggests it has utilized the Consistency Provision to its
fullest extent in a very limited fashion, if at all.  Third, other proposed
solutions to Louisiana’s coastal management efforts are briefly examined
to suggest that the CZMA is one of the best available alternatives at this
juncture.  Next, Louisiana’s use of the CZMA is compared to that of other,
arguably more successful, states.  Examples are plentiful, with California,
Delaware, Florida, and Washington the most prominent.  These states have
exerted their authority under the Act to either eliminate or severely limit
harmful uses in their coastal zones.  Following this analysis, the Comment
seeks to address specific obstacles Louisiana may encounter if it endeavors
to use the Consistency Provision more aggressively.  Finally, the Comment
makes recommendations for a more effective utilization of the Act in
Louisiana, including blocking future oil and gas lease sales, and raising
consistency objections for renewals of federal licenses and permits.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CZMA
A.  Enactment
Following the economic boom of World War II, there was a rapid
expansion of activity in the coastal zone.2  By the mid 1960s, Congress
recognized the resulting decline in coastal resources and water quality as a
national crisis.3  Julius Stratton led what became known as the “Stratton
Commission,” which struggled to suggest a comprehensive approach for
protecting the coast.  The Stratton Commission’s final report4 focused on
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Nation and the Sea: A Plan for National Action (United States Government Printing Office
1969).
5. Id. at 89-90.  The term “coastal zone,” coined by Stratton, implies “integration across
geographic boundaries.”  Id. at 91.
6. Edward M. Cheston, An Overview and Analysis of the Consistency Requirement
Under the Coastal Zone Management Act, 10 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 135, 136 (2003).  States
are inherently closer to regional problems and have traditionally held authority over zoning
and wetlands preservation.  See Gibbons, supra note 2, at 101.
7. Cheston, supra note 6, at 140 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-753 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 4776).
8. Gibbons, supra note 2, at 84.
9. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (2000). “Each Federal agency activity within or outside the
coastal zone that affects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone shall
be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the
enforceable policies of approved state management programs.”  Id. at § 1456(c)(1)(A).
development and land use interests, recognizing that states possessed the
greatest amount of knowledge about their respective coastlines.  Coupled
with the federal government’s strong interest in uniformity—and its
prominent position as a coastal actor, both as polluter and developer—the
report suggested the partnership format that became one of the key aspects
of the Act.5  Congress did not want to preempt a traditionally state area of
authority.6  Thus, one of the primary goals of the CZMA is to “enhance
state authority by encouraging and assisting states to assume planning and
regulatory powers over their coastal zone.”7  The Act has been characterized
as an example of  “‘cooperative federalism,’ in which the federal govern-
ment delegates administrative and enforcement responsibilities to the
states . . . .”8
The CZMA has three major defining characteristics.  First, the federal
government grants funds to a state for development of a state coastal zone
management plan (CMP).  Second, that plan must be approved by the
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the
Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), at which point additional funds are
made available for administration of the plan.  Finally, once an approved
plan is in place, the state gains authority to utilize the Consistency Provision
of the CZMA.9  The Consistency Provision, explained further below, allows
states a type of veto power over federal activities in the state’s delineated
coastal zone.
B.  State Development of Coastal Management Plans
In formulating a CMP, the state has many opportunities to interject its
own independent rules and regulations.  To get a plan approved, however,
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10. Gibbons, supra note 2, at 93.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (2000).  The state
management program must include, inter alia, a definition of permissible uses; guidelines
as to priorities of uses; a planning process for energy facilities; and a planning process for
identifying and lessening the impact of shoreline erosion.  See also NOAA, Dept. of
Commerce, 15 C.F.R. § 923.53 (2006), for regulations regarding the language of a state
Consistency Provision.
11. See NOAA, Dept. of Commerce, 15 C.F.R. § 923.135(b) (2006).
12. One particularly relevant comparison in this regard is between the consistency
language contained in Florida’s CMP, as opposed to that contained in Louisiana’s.  Florida’s
language is much more specific, naming the various federal activities that will be subject to
consistency review.  See FLA. STAT. § 380.23(3) (2005).  Florida also delegates the
consistency determination to the agency responsible for administering the relevant federal
program.  Id.  Another interesting element of Florida’s consistency language is the fact that
the state holds the determining agency responsible for defending its determination, if
challenged.  Id.  Louisiana’s Consistency Provision is broader, simply stating that “[a]ny
governmental undertaking, conducting, or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal
zone shall ensure that such activities shall be consistent to the maximum extent practicable
with the state program and any affected approved local program having geographical
jurisdiction over the action.”  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.32(B) (2006).  Under the
Louisiana CMP, one individual is ultimately responsible for the consistency determination.
Id. at § 49:214.32(C)(1).
13. The declaration of public policy for Louisiana’s CMP is healthy enough:
The legislature declares it the public policy of the state: 
(1) To protect, develop, and, where feasible, restore or enhance the resources of the
state’s coastal zone. . . . (3) To support and encourage multiple use of coastal
resources consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of renewable resource
management and productivity, the need to provide for adequate economic growth and
development and the minimization of adverse effects of one resource use upon
another, and without imposing any undue restriction on any user.
LA.REV.STAT.ANN. § 49:214.22 (2006).  But the state agency responsible for administering
the program seems to interpret the statement in a manner favorable to development.  For
the state must show that it provided federal agencies an opportunity to
participate in its development.  Furthermore, prescribed enactment proce-
dures must be followed, “including holding public hearings and designating
a single agency with the authority to implement the program and to receive
and administer the grants.”10  If a state is deemed ineffective in adminis-
tering its CMP, funding may be revoked by the Secretary.11  Plans vary
considerably in their structure and administration from state to state.  Some
states delegate the consistency determination to a single individual, such as
the state’s Governor.  Others make broad delegations to all agencies dealing
with coastal permitting issues.  The statutory language itself also varies
widely from state to state.12  In some, the goals of preserving the coast shine
through more readily.  Others, like Louisiana’s CMP, have a broader, pro-
development slant to their language, with emphasis placed on accommo-
dating as much development as possible.13
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example, on the agency’s website, the objective of Louisiana’s CMP is formulated as
follows:  “Its broad intent is to encourage multiple uses of resources and adequate economic
growth while minimizing adverse effects of one resource use upon another without imposing
undue restrictions on any user.”  Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Coastal
Management Division, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/crm/coastmgt/ coastmgt.asp (last visited Oct.
1, 2006).
14. See S. REP. NO. 94-277, at 19-21 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1768,
1786-89. 
15. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1012, at 16 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4362,
4364.  The legislative history suggests that Congress hoped states would develop coastal
management plans focusing on preservation, “priority consideration to coastal dependent
uses in the coastal zone,” public access, and public and local participation.  Id.
16. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 315 (1984).
17. Gibbons, supra note 2, at 97.  In Secretary of the Interior v. California, the Supreme
Court held that the sale of OCS oil and gas leases by the Department of the Interior was not
subject to a consistency determination because it did not “directly affect” the coastal zone.
California argued that the sale of the leases set off a chain of events eventually resulting in
the development of OCS resources—an activity clearly impacting the coastal zone.  Id.  The
1990 amendment was “intended to clarify that the relevant factor in consistency
determinations would not be the location of agency activity, but on the effect, including
reasonably foreseeable indirect effects.”  Id. at 108.
18. S. REP. NO. 109-137, at 3 (2005) (Comm. on Commerce Rep.).
C.  Reauthorizations
The CZMA has been subject to reauthorization several times since its
original enactment. When the Act was first reauthorized, in 1976, Congress
recognized the danger posed to coastal resources by the impending
development of Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) energy facilities.  In the
midst of a national energy crisis, Congress reauthorized the CZMA and
urged states to develop processes to effectively manage the impact of OCS
development.14  In 1980, the Act was again reauthorized and strengthened.
At this juncture Congress sought to clarify the public policy of the Act and
provide states with more specificity.15  The Act was once again reauthorized
in 1990, when Congress specifically overturned a 1984 Supreme Court
decision that had limited state use of the Consistency Provision by narrowly
defining the term “directly affecting.”16  This had the effect of making “all
federal activities inside or outside the coastal zone subject to consistency
determinations if they affected the coastal zone.”17
The last official reauthorization of the Act occurred in 1996.  That
reauthorization expired in 1999, and the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy
recommended that the Act be reauthorized and strengthened in its 2004
report.18
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19. 151 CONG. REC. S1290 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Snowe).
Previously, there had been a two million dollar cap.  The new bill also authorizes increased
overall funding for fiscal years 2006-2010.  Id.
20. Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 109-137, at 13-14, Congressional Findings (2005) (Comm.
on Commerce Rep.):
(14) There is a need to enhance cooperation and coordination among states and local
communities, to encourage local community-based solutions that address the impacts
and pressures on coastal resources and on public facilities and public service caused
by continued coastal demands, and to increase state and local capacity to identify
public infrastructure and open space needs and develop and implement plans which
provide for sustainable growth, resource protection and community revitalization.
(15) The establishment of a national system of estuarine research reserves will
provide for protection of essential estuarine resources, as well as for a network of
State-based reserves that will serve as sites for coastal stewardship best-practices,
monitoring, research, education, and training to improve coastal management and to
help translate science and inform coastal decisionmakers and the public. 
Id.
21. Id. at 3. 
22. See id.
23. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (2000), for the text of the Consistency Provision:
(c) Consistency of Federal activities with state management programs; . . .
certification.
(1)(A) Each Federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that affects any
land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone shall be carried out in a
manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable
policies of approved State management programs.  Id.
The provision is a “carrot” to the states which allows the federal government some level of
uniformity for a coastal management plan while allowing states to block what would
Currently, the 2005 reauthorization of the CZMA is pending approval
by Congress.  The renewed Act is not significantly altered, and has in fact
been strengthened in several respects.  One positive change is that a limit
on funding grants has been removed, allowing states to receive additional
monies to implement coastal management programs.19  The reauthorization
also stresses the importance of community level development, preventing
nonpoint source pollution, and protecting estuary systems.20  Debate at the
committee level for the reauthorization bill focused on the streamlining of
the permitting process for offshore industries.21  Supporters feel the process
allows sufficient time for state comment and the development of a record
for potential appeals.22  Crucially, the Consistency Provision remains.
D. The Consistency Provision
Perhaps the most controversial element of the CZMA, the Consistency
Provision, is also a strong incentive for states to develop and maintain a
CMP in line with the expectations of Congress.23  The provision essentially
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otherwise be an allowable federal activity.  John A. Duff, The Coastal Zone Management
Act: Reverse Pre-Emption or Contractual Federalism?, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 109, 112
(2001).  When a state objects to a federal activity, it must have a rational basis for that
objection; “this has proven to be a NEPA like tool that fosters sound and informed decision
making.”  Id.  The Consistency Provision is “hotly contested and fiercely debated.”
Cheston, supra note 6, at 138; see also NOAA, Dept. of Commerce, 15 C.F.R. § 930.1
(2005).
24. J. Christopher Martin, The Use of the CZMA Consistency Provisions to Preserve and
Restore the Coastal Zone in Louisiana, 51 LA. L. REV. 1087, 1093 (1991).  Martin pursues
an identical thesis admirably in his 1991 work.  Since his publication, the state has continued
to proceed in a less than desirable manner.   The Act itself has been subject to additional
reauthorizations and Louisiana has been struck by multiple hurricanes.  Also, in the decade
and a half since Martin’s article, several other examples of states effective utilization of the
Consistency Provision have emerged.  Essentially, a need to re-examine the Consistency
Provision, and perhaps re-emphasize its importance in the battle for Louisiana’s wetlands,
is vital.  This Comment seeks to do so.
25. Gibbons, supra note 2, at 95.
26. Section 381 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 mandates deadlines for decisions on
consistency appeals.  Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (Aug. 8, 2005).  In general however,
the process can be described as lengthy, sometimes taking years to complete.
27. 15 C.F.R. § 930.43, 930.63 (2006).  Both the activity and permit consistency
determination regulations provide for public participation in the process.
gives states with an approved CMP a veto power over federal activity that
affects the state coastal zone.  “Federal activity” falls into two broad
categories: (1) activity conducted by a federal agency or (2) activities/
development that requires a federal license or permit.  The federal agency
which conducts or supports the activity generally makes the initial
consistency determination.  If the state objects, it can seek mediation by the
Secretary of Commerce or judicial intervention to enjoin the activity.24  In
the case of a license or permit, the applicant must provide a certification
with their application that their activities are consistent with the state
CMP.25  Whatever entity is responsible for making the consistency
determination must do so after all relevant materials have been received.
The amount of time an agency has to do so varies by state.26  If a state finds
that the proposed federal activity is inconsistent with its CMP, it must
inform the federal agency or permit applicant: (1) how the activity is
inconsistent; (2) with what specific enforceable policies it conflicts; and (3)
suggested alternative measures that would make the activity “consistent to
the maximum extent practicable” with the CMP.27  Once this decision is
made, it can be overridden by the Secretary of Commerce or the President
—but the battle does not end there.  The state may then pursue litigation to
contest the ultimate federal decision.  The objective of the Consistency
Provision, and the regulations that implement it, is to “assure that all
Federal agency activities including development projects affecting any
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28. 15 C.F.R. § 930.30 (2006).  
29. Duff, supra note 23, at 110.
30. Cheston, supra note 6, at 152.
31. Gibbons, supra note 2, at 85.
32. Martin, supra note 24, at 1110.  The Martin figures are from 1991.  The State of
Louisiana Coastal Restoration and Management Office attaches more alarming figures to
this statistic—thirty and ninety percent, respectively.  See http://www.dnr.state.la.us/crm/
coastalfacts.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).  “Louisiana’s coastal zone consists of the area
between the Mississippi Deltaic Plain to the east and the Chenier Plain in the western portion
of the state.”  Marc C. Hebert, Coastal Restoration under CWPPRA and Property Rights
Issues, 57 LA. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1997).
33. Julie D. Livaudais, Conflicting Interests in Southern Louisiana’s Wetlands:  Private
Developers Versus Conservationists, and the State and Federal Regulatory Roles, 56 TUL.
L. REV. 1006, 1033 (1982).
34. Martin, supra note 24, at 1087.  “Coastal erosion has been an enemy of Louisiana’s
coastal wetlands and marshes since the early 1940s when a series of flood control levees
were constructed along the Lower Mississippi River, confining the river to a single channel.”
Hebert, supra note 32, at 1167.  The “delicate balance” in place before this occurred allowed
wetland restoration and the erosion process eased.  Id.
coastal use or resource will be undertaken in a manner consistent to the
maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved
[state] management programs.”28
Critics of the Consistency Provision contend that it has a “reverse pre-
emption” effect on federal activity and authority29 and that the federal
government’s hands are tied in regard to conducting legitimate federal
activities that promote national interests.30  Critics also argue that the
provision leads to inefficiency in government, and undermines the federal
system by restricting federal agencies acting under explicit constitutional
authority, including national defense.31  However, without the provision,
there would be little incentive for state participation in the program because
the financial incentives do not alone justify the extensive expenditures an
effective state coastal management program requires. 
III. LOUISIANA’S COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Louisiana possesses forty percent of the nation’s wetlands and is
experiencing eighty percent of the nation’s wetland losses.32  The state’s
coastal zone consists of eighteen parishes and includes approximately seven
million acres.33  Wetlands in Louisiana disappear at a rate of twenty-five to
fifty square miles each year.34  While the state has some of the most
lucrative energy resources in the nation, it also possesses some of the most
productive commercial fisheries.  Balancing these two interests has proven
a formidable task.  The state passed its coastal management plan, the State
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35. Martin, supra note 24, at 1090.  The SLCRMA was approved by the federal
government as a coastal resource management program in 1980.  Currently, the
administrative unit responsible for administering the SLCRMA is divided into three
divisions:  Coastal Restoration, Coastal Engineering, and Coastal Management.  See
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources,  Office of Coastal Restoration and Manage-
ment, http://www.dnr.state.la.us/crm/about.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
36. Martin, supra note 24, at 1087-89.  Martin points out that natural subsidence, until
recently, produced only a small amount of net land loss.  Furthermore, the levee systems on
the Mississippi have been in place since the 1800s, and large scale loss of coastal wetlands
did not begin to occur until the 1950s.  Id. at 1089.  He thus suggests that the most
detrimental factors are dredging and development.  Id. at 1087-89.  Most dredging is done
for the benefit of the oil industry, as it assists in “navigation, mineral exploration and
production.”  Id. at 1089.  The loss of land due to erosion and subsidence harms the state not
only in terms of potential hurricane damage, but also in the wallet.  For example, in the
Terrebonne Parish, “$84 million of assessed property . . . lies below the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway and is in danger of washing away.”  Mark Schleifstein, Corps is Narrowing its
List of Coastal Erosion Projects: Only Limited Number Can Get Financing, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Apr. 20, 2004, at National 2.  One author places the blame for wetlands losses
in areas such as Grand Isle and Fouchon directly upon the shoulders of the oil and gas
industry: 
Canals dredged and pipeline bulkheads built for the excavation of oil and gas were
not kept in good repair.  Many oil companies abandoned dry holes or unproductive
wells without blocking off or filling in the canals dredged to reach the wells, even
though such action was required by state law.  
Hebert, supra note 32, at 1168.
37. Martin, supra note 24, at 1094.
The Coastal Use Guidelines provide stringent requirements which must be met by
any actor in the coastal zone.  In addition to broad general application guidelines, the
Coastal Use Guidelines also contain specific guidelines for levees, linear facilities
(pipelines), dredged spoil deposition, shore modification, surface alterations,
hydrologic and sediments transports modifications, disposal of wastes, and oil, gas
and other mineral activities.
Id. at 1099 n.88.
38. Livaudais, supra note 33, at 1033. 
39. Id.
and Local Coastal Resources Management Act (SLCRMA), in 1978.35  The
major factors contributing to coastal wetland loss in the state are natural
subsidence, the levee systems, dredging, and development.36  The Coastal
Use Guidelines contained in Louisiana’s SLCRMA are “quite extensive and
allow the state to review virtually all significant activities occurring in the
coastal zone area.”37  State coastal use permits are required for areas of state
concern, while local use permits are required for areas of local concern.38
Areas of state concern will generally deal with areas encompassing dredge
and fill activities in “waters intersecting more than one waterbody,” while
areas of local concern are more isolated.39  Once a permit application is
received, a decision is rendered by the Coastal Management section of the
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40. Id.
41. Id. at 1007.  “Healthy wetlands have the crucial ability to absorb and buffer the
energy from storm surges created by hurricanes, reducing their inland impact.”  Hebert,
supra note 32, at 1169.
42. Matt Scallan,  Big Storm Could Flood City Through Gaps in Floodwalls, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE, June 1, 1993, at A1.
43. Id.
44. Bob Marshall, Centuries of Missteps Sealed City’s Fate , THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug.
26, 2006, at National 1.
45. Bob Marshall, Studies Abound on Why the Levees Failed, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Mar. 23, 2006, at National 1.
46. Id.
47. Id.  Furthermore, “sophisticated storm-surge models . . . consistently overpredicted
surge heights in areas that were protected by wetlands.”  Id.
48. Marshall, supra note 44.  “By the 1970s more than 30,000 miles of canals had been
dredged largely for oil, gas, and shipping interests; half the wetlands had been lost; and the
Gulf had moved within sight of the city’s suburbs.”  Id.
Department of Natural Resources.  Any appeals are taken up with the
Louisiana Coastal Commission, “an independent body within” the Depart-
ment.40
The state has long known the destructive danger of a potential hurricane
strike, yet did little to protect its “natural buffer zone against hurricanes.”41
Unfortunately, efforts to address the threat of a major hurricane strike have
consistently focused on raising and strengthening existing levee systems.
In 1965, New Orleans was struck and heavily damaged by Hurricane Betsy,
a Category 3 storm.42  The Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) then
began in earnest to raise and strengthen levees, despite officials’ acknowl-
edgement that even vastly improved levee systems could not withstand a
Category 4 or 5 storm.43
Previous research has estimated that “storm surge can be reduced by
one foot for every two miles of coastal wetlands.”44  Examinations of the
failed levee systems in New Orleans following hurricane Katrina suggested
that “wetlands . . . proved to be effective natural armor for levees.”45
Wetlands slow the speed of storm surge by serving as a source of friction
and elevation that the surge must overcome before it reaches the levee
system.46  If the surge speed and size is reduced, the levees can withstand
a much more significant storm.  This concept was illustrated by the
surviving levees in the wake of Katrina; levees with a buffer of wetlands
were left largely intact.47  Although the levee systems in Louisiana have
certainly played a crucial role in the subsidence of wetlands, this process
“compressed to just a few decades when the discovery of oil and gas in the
coastal zone set off a period of lightly regulated canal dredging.”48  Canal
construction and the pumping dry of marshes for oil exploration “severely
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49. Livaudais, supra note 33, at 1007.
50. Id. at 1008.
51. See, e.g., Louisiana Pipe Break Points Up Risks of Offshore Drilling, THE TAMPA
TRIBUNE, Apr. 16, 2002, at Nation/World 10.  “[N]early 75,000 gallons of oil spilled into
an estuary when a pipeline carrying offshore oil to a refinery ruptured.  Strong winds
complicated cleanup operations, and the oil tainted brackish waters rich in marine life.”  Id.
52. Matthew Brown, Coast Lost 64,000 Acres to Storms: Habited Areas Now at Even
More Risk, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 3, 2005, at National 1.
53. Hebert, supra note 32, at 1169.
54. Id. at 1170.  “Economic benefits to the state from commercial marine fisheries are
about $1 billion a year, and saltwater recreational fishing is estimated to approach that
figure.”  Id.
55. See Louisiana v. Lujan, 777 F. Supp. 486, 489 (E.D. La. 1991).  This case apparently
arose during the administration of Louisiana Governor Buddy Roemer.  Governor Roemer
thought he had convinced the federal government to allocate more funds to the state, and
subsequently signed off on the consistency determination.  When the increase in funds never
materialized, Governor Roemer attempted to renege on the consistency finding, and “went
to court to stop the sale.”  Mark Schleifstein, Permits May Be Erosion Fighter: State Could
alters the natural hydrologic cycle and destroys fish, wildlife, and their
habitats, by changing the amount of flowing water and allowing salt water
to enter formerly freshwater areas.”49  This same process lowers water table
levels, causing marshes to “dry up and shrink,” resulting in subsidence.50
Drilling for oil and gas also poses significant threats to the coastal
environment via pipeline construction, dredging, and potential oil spills.51
Finally, the 2005 hurricane season made the need for Louisiana to protect
and restore its wetlands abundantly clear as “Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
shredded or sank at least 100 square miles of marshland along Louisiana’s
fragile coastline,” placing populated areas at an even greater risk in the
event of a future hurricane.52
Aside from traditional environmental preservation ideals, Louisiana has
exceedingly strong economic incentives to preserve and restore its wetlands
and coastal zone.  The state supports “over [thirty] percent of the Nation’s
fisheries.”53  Commercial fisheries in the state lead the nation in production,
“with landings exceeding 1 billion pounds each year.”54  Furthermore,
tourism, property values, and even oil and gas revenues depend on the
coastal zone remaining intact and healthy.  Nevertheless, the state’s
administration of the CZMA is among the most ineffective of any state in
the Nation.
Case law regarding Louisiana’s use of the CZMA is limited.  The cases
that do exist, however, suggest ineffective usage of the Consistency
Provision.  In what this Author fears is an illustrative case, Louisiana failed
to present the Secretary with evidence that the sale of an OCS lease would
cause severe environmental damage.55  Following approval of the lease, the
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Block Oil and Gas Drilling, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 17, 2004, at National 9.  
56. Louisiana v. Lujan, 777 F. Supp. at 488.  “[T]his Court does consider the plaintiffs
[sic] extreme delay in making its objections, to be one of the compellingly relevant factors
in its consideration of the plaintiffs [sic] ultimate ability to carry the heavy burden necessary
to prevail on the merits.”  Id.
57. Id.
58. See Oliver A. Houck, Symposium: Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America’s
Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REV. 358, 359 (1988).
59. Id. at 361-62.  “We have created a Dr. Seuss-like machine that produces occasionally
good, but more often poor, compromises at the end of an elaborate pipeline.”  Id. at 362.
Louisiana appears to have been “solicitous to energy industry concerns at the expense of the
environment.”  Martin, supra note 24, at 1099.  Rarely has its authority been used to restrain
or halt any activity in the coastal zone, especially those undertaken by the oil industry or the
Army Corps.  For example, Louisiana’s coastal management division wanted the spoil of
dredging conducted in the Mississippi Gulf River Outlet to be deposited on the northern
shore of the canal at issue to help control erosion of wetlands north of the canal.  Id. at 1095.
The canal had almost eroded through to an adjoining lake and if such a breach did occur,
erosion of adjoining wetlands would occur at an increased rate.  Id. at 1101.  The levee
system protecting St. Bernard Parish from hurricane surges was also threatened.  Id.
state’s coastal commission appealed the Secretary’s decision, but was
extremely late in doing so.56  As a result, overturning the Secretary’s
decision required the court to find that the Secretary had acted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner—a heavy burden for plaintiffs to carry,
according to the court.57  The State was woefully inadequate in addressing
this arguable violation of the Consistency Provision of the CZMA, and did
not appeal the district court decision.  Considering this is one of the few
cases available on the subject, it may be reasonable to hypothesize that the
state is losing many consistency battles without even putting up a fight.
Why has the state failed to utilize such an obvious tool to protect its most
important resource?  The CZMA is a unique legislative creation, rare in the
fact that it abdicates federal rights in favor of state action.  While much of
the blame for the extent of the damage inflicted by Hurricane Katrina has
fallen squarely on the shoulders of the federal government, Louisiana may
bear a more significant share of responsibility for failing to assert powers
that could have been used to limit coastal erosion, dredging, and pollution
since 1978. 
At least one author has argued, however, that the state and federal
regulatory programs are inherently unable to deal with the problem of
coastal wetland loss.58  The funding for the agencies is limited, their
structures are fragmented, and their personnel are stretched thin.59  The
inability of the agencies to stem the onslaught of oil and gas development
has resulted in “a foregone conclusion that most of the remaining wetlands
in Louisiana’s coastal zone will be lost along with many of our coastal
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60. Houck, supra note 58, at 369 (internal quotation omitted).  Oil and gas industries
dredge hundreds of new canals a year, with approximately 10,000 miles having been dug
over the last fifty plus years.  Id.  Furthermore, to transport the product derived from the
coastal zone, the industry must lay thousands of miles of pipeline.  Id. at 370.   These canals
erode and widen “at a rate that will double their size within ten years.”  Id.  Again, it is noted
that these canals result in increased levels of saltwater in previously freshwater marshes.
This leads to a destructive chain of events:  “more saline waters kill[] the plant life that holds
the soils together; the roots disintegrate; the soil disintegrates; and the marshes disappear.”
Id.
61. S. REP. NO. 109-137, at 4, 12 (2005).
62. For example, “Louisiana governors have traditionally signed off” on lease sales.  Jan
Moller & Pam Radtke Russell, Blanco: No Offshore Signoffs Unless La. Gets Royalty Share;
Money Could Finance Hurricane Protection, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 1, 2006, at
National 3.  Various articles substantiate the rubber-stamping that has occurred for lease
sales in the state in the preceding decades by simply discussing the financial aspects
involved and the prospects of future sales.  See, e.g., Mary Judice, Offshore Oil, Gas Lease
Sale Today: Record 1,790 Bids Submitted, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 5, 1997, at C1;
Jaquetta White, Oil and Gas Lease Sales Gush to Seven-Year High: Skyrocketing Prices at
the Pump Draw $285 Million for Western Gulf Tracts, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 18,
2005, at Money 1.
63. Martin, supra note 24, at 1099.  Louisiana has the highest rate of coastal permit
seekers in the nation, but has an extremely low decline rate—0.64%.  Id.  Interestingly, the
state is limited to revenue sharing from the oil and gas industry production “within three
miles of the shoreline.”  Livaudais, supra note 33, at 1008.  Thus, if the shoreline continues
to recede, Louisiana stands to lose a large portion of the revenue it likely used to justify
allowing development in the first place.  See id.  Livaudais notes what is perhaps obvious,
but troubling nonetheless, that “[t]he need for state and local officials to generate revenue
and employment for their constituents may interfere with their concern for conservation of
wetlands ecosystems.”  Id. at 1034.  This proposition is somewhat counterintuitive; the state
derives nearly as much revenue from oil and gas development as it does from commercial
fishing and tourism—it is essentially robbing Peter to pay Paul.
communities.”60  This theory must be called into question, however, by the
successes of other states, such as California and Florida.  If additional
funding would in fact solve the problem, the state may be in luck, as the
most recent reauthorization provides significant additional funding.61
Furthermore, oil and gas development does not need to be eliminated;
rather, the damage inflicted by these interests simply needs to be limited,
more effectively mitigated, or delayed while the state rebuilds.  
Louisiana has been less than effective in slowing the rate of wetland
loss.  Examples of development interests trumping those of the coast
abound62 and the state has been accused of managing the coastal zone in a
manner that seeks to yield “merely non-detrimental” effects, rather than
positive ones.63
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64. Houck, supra note 58, at 372-73.  Houck argues that a BAT standard is particularly
appropriate for these industries because they are in the best position, financially, to absorb
the cost of developing new technology.  Id. at 373.  He suggests, for example, hovercrafts
for transporting persons and equipment.  Id.  He goes on to suggest that any level of the
administrative framework could potentially implement such a standard—the EPA, the Army
Corps, or the coastal districts.  Id. at 374.
65. However, additional funding has in fact been made available by the pending 2005
reauthorization of the CZMA, which as of August 26, 2006 was still on the legislative
calendar.  
66. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3951-3956 (1994).  In 1997, there were a “total of 66 projects in the
nine basins with a baseline cost of approximately $169.2 million.”  Hebert, supra note 32,
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS OUTSIDE AN EXPANDED UTILIZATION OF THE
CZMA CONSISTENCY PROVISION
One of the major obstacles to effective coastal management, i.e.
actually restoring coastal wetlands rather than simply seeking to stem the
tide of their destruction, appears to have been a sense of apathy and
economic infeasibility on the part of state and local governments in
Louisiana.  With the horrific and unfortunate destruction that Hurricane
Katrina has wrought on the region, the state is faced with a difficult but
opportune situation.  There has probably never been more incentive or
public support for managing the coast in a manner that would have
potentially lessened the blow of the hurricane.  While it is difficult to argue
that the coast would have remained unscathed, it is certainly permissible to
hypothesize that the levee system would not have been as stressed had more
coastal wetlands remained.  Furthermore, simply because Hurricane Katrina
could not have been altogether avoided does not suggest that the damage
from future hurricanes cannot be significantly impacted with more effective
management policies.  Along those lines, there are several possible alter-
natives available to the state as it rebuilds, both physically and politically.
One option would be to impose a “best available technology” (BAT)
standard on oil and gas companies operating in the coastal zone.64  A second
option would be to advocate for increased funding from the federal level in
the hopes of encouraging more aggressive state action; however, with the
federal budget already constrained, this appears unlikely.65  Furthermore,
some states have been moderately successful under the current approach,
thus suggesting that the problems faced by Louisiana do not stem from the
federal level.  
Much faith has been placed in the massive cooperative restoration effort
being staged by Louisiana and the Army Corps.  This series of projects is
aimed at restoration and falls under the authority of the Coastal Wetlands
Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA).66  This is just one
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at 1178.  While most, if not all, of these projects are admirable endeavors, they have been
tripped up by inadequate funding and “problems concern[ing] property rights and civil
damages under Louisiana law.”  Id. at 1180.  “[U]nder Louisiana law the courts have been
generous towards the rights of the riparian landowner.”  Id. at 1182.
67. Mark Schleifstein, Corps is Narrowing its List of Coastal Erosion Projects: Only
Limited Number Can Get Financing, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 20, 2004, at National 2.
68. Jack H. Archer & Terrance W. Stone, The Interaction of the Public Trust and the
“Takings” Doctrines: Protecting Wetlands and Critical Coastal Areas , 20 VT. L. REV. 81,
99 (1995).
69. Id. at 108.
70. Id. at 100.
State coastal and environmental managers rely upon police power, statutes, and
constitutions for their authority. . . . [T]he Public Trust provides a source of authority,
separate from and in addition to a state’s police power, to manage, protect, and
preserve public trust lands and waters for the benefit of the people.  
Id. (emphasis added).
71. Gibbons, supra note 2, at 110.  Given the “track record of other coastal states when
piece of the puzzle, however, and with limited funding, the Army Corps
appears to be more interested in protecting areas that have to date suffered
little erosion, rather than restoring an area already lost.67  These piecemeal
projects may assist in the rebuilding of Louisiana’s coastal wetlands, but
they do not offer a legal framework for preventing future damage.  A final
alternative worth mentioning is noted by commentators Jack Archer and
Terrance Stone.  Their approach advocates, inter alia, the incorporation of
the public trust doctrine into the application of the CZMA.68  The approach
suggests that the state or authority can avoid takings challenges under the
rationale of the public trust doctrine by designating coastal areas as “areas
of particular concern” and protecting them vigilantly.69  However, as noted
infra, takings challenges do not appear to have been a major obstacle in the
administration of the Act.  While public trust doctrine principles may
certainly play a role in the management of coastal resources, they must
operate in concert with management plans already in place.70  The best
alternative is for the state to utilize the Consistency Provision of the CZMA
in a more aggressive fashion.  It can do this by requiring a showing of
consistency for any new or potentially suspended oil or gas lease, and for
future permit applications.  While this alternative will not solve Louisiana’s
wetlands problems, it will go a long way in addressing them and perhaps
serve as a wakeup call to the oil and gas industry in the state.   
Detractors might argue that the state will simply lose any potential
litigation battle over a consistency determination.  But, the burden of
proving consistency is on the federal agency or permit/license applicant.
Thus, the potential exists for the state to “set the consistency bar high in
order to force benefits, and then pursue litigation if unsatisfied.”71
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disputes have gone as far as litigation, Louisiana should win more than its share of the
cases.”  Martin, supra note 24, at 1102.
72. Gibbons, supra note 2, at 113 (citing Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30233 (b)).
73. Cal. Coastal Comm'n. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (1998).
74. Gibbons, supra note 2, at 113.  The Navy had proposed to remove 7.9 million cubic
yards of sand in order to deepen a channel into San Diego so that an aircraft carrier could
be relocated. Id.  The resolution of the issue took over three years.  Id.
75. Id. at 115-16.  Gibbons sees this outcome in a negative light because of the expense
to the federal government in litigating the issue.  See id.
76. Martin, supra note 24, at 1100 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.
1986)).  In that case, Exxon sought to drill oil wells that the Secretary had found would not
have “substantial effect” on land and water uses in the coastal zone.  Exxon Corp. v. Fischer,
807 F.2d at 846.  Nevertheless, the Secretary upheld the CCC’s challenge because he found
that adverse impact could be avoided completely by restricting drilling to the off-season.
Id.
77. 520 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
78. See id. at 803.  “[T]his court holds that Congress did not intend to leave [Interstate
Commerce Commission] abandonment proceedings outside the scope of the CZMA.”  Id.
Examples of states doing so are few and far between—but they do exist.  To
the extent that states have sought to assert their powers under the con-
sistency provision of the CZMA, they have been largely successful.
V. THE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE CONSISTENCY PROVISION
 IN OTHER STATES
A.  California and Delaware
California’s Coastal Management Act requires that all spoils (dredged
materials) from the coastal zone be used for beach nourishment.72  In
California Coastal Commission v. United States,73 the Navy attempted to
deposit dredged materials in a location other than where previously agreed
to in the consistency negotiation.74  Using the CZMA Consistency
Provision, the California Coastal Commission (CCC) was able to “hold out”
to force a more expensive solution to the Navy’s unexpected dredging
difficulty, and essentially was able to compel the Navy to deposit the
dredged materials in the original location—despite the greater expense.75
California has also successfully used the CZMA to protect its fishing
industry by forcing the oil industry to conduct its offshore exploration
activities only while the fishing season is closed.76
In Southern Pacific Transportation Company v. California Coastal
Commission,77 another example of California’s comparably effective use of
the CZMA, the state exerted its authority to prevent the removal of rail lines
in abandonment proceedings without a consistency review.78  There, the
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The court also noted that the legislative history of the CZMA indicated that the consistency
power of the states was to be limited only by “matters of overriding national interest.”  Id.
(quoting S. REP. NO. 94-277,  reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1768, 1776).
79. Id. at 802.
80. Id. at 806.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 807.
83. Martin, supra note 24, at 1100.
84. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7001 (2005).  The declaration includes a ban on any
new offshore bulk transfer facilities because of the danger of pollution and the potential for
more heavy industry in the coastal zone. Id.  The “protection of the environment, natural
beauty, and recreation potential of the State” are placed on equal footing with the
development of new industries.  Id.
85. See Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Del. 1986).  The statute
defines “bulk product transfer facility” as “any port or dock facility, whether an artificial
island or attached to shore by any means, for the transfer of bulk quantities of any substance
from vessel to onshore facility or vice versa.”  Id. at 1230 n.9.  Delaware is ideally situated
for facilities such as these because of its east coast location and the depth of its waters.
railroad company sought to avoid the requirements under the Consistency
Provision by arguing that federal law preempted the CZMA,79 and that the
imposition was a violation of the Commerce Clause.80  The court ruled there
was no conflict between the abandonment provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act and the CZMA because the consistency requirements did
not prevent the Interstate Commerce Commission from making its “core
decision” regarding the initial cessation of service.81  Furthermore, the
Commerce Clause was not implicated because the railroad had not
“demonstrated that the potential loss of some income due to a short delay
as a result of CZMA-mandated consistency review is a significant burden
on the railroad’s performance of its interstate commerce function.”82
California’s Coastal Commission has, to date, been the best example of
a state effectively utilizing the Act’s powers.  The CCC has not been over-
turned or challenged in many instances.  Furthermore, it has successfully
pushed the language of the Act to protect its coastal zone.  California has
a longer coastline, a much larger population, and, perhaps as a result, has
more fiscal resources than Louisiana.  However, states with comparably
sized, or even smaller coastlines have used the Act to their advantage as
well.
For example, Delaware has successfully used its powers under the
CZMA to prevent any new bulk transfer facilities in the state’s coastal
zone.83  Delaware’s declaration of public policy for its Coastal Zone Act is
straightforward and encompassed in a single paragraph.84  In a case
challenging the statute’s ban on new bulk product transfer facilities, the law
was upheld.85  The reasoning of the court in that decision suggested a high
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These facilities are generally used to transfer oil from large tankers to smaller ones, for the
purposes of navigating shallow waters elsewhere on the coast.  See id. at 1229.
86. Id. at 1250.
87. Id. at 1252.  Also of interest is the note made by the court regarding the fact that
“[j]obs and tax revenues were among the reasons invoked in opposition to the Delaware
[Coastal Zone Act].”  Id. at 1237.  Presumably, many of the same arguments regarding the
oil and gas industries are encountered in Louisiana.  This decision provides at least some
support for the proposition that Louisiana’s Coastal Commission could exert more authority.
88. Id. at 1245.
89. Id. at 1248.  See also id. at 1250.  “The Secretary’s approval is not a rubber stamp,
but is subject to statutory requirements.”  Id.
90. See Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 583 (D. Mass. 1983).
91. Id. at 566.
92. Id. at 567.  The State alleged, inter alia, “that the defendants have violated the
Coastal Zone Management Act, [16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465] (CZMA) by failing to
demonstrate that Lease Sale 52 is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the
Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Program.”  Id. at 568.
93. Id. at 574.  Policy 9 provides:
a. Accommodate exploration, development and production of offshore oil and gas
resources while minimizing impacts on the marine environment, especially on
fisheries, water quality and wildlife, and on the recreational values of the coast, and
minimizing conflicts with other maritime-dependent uses of coastal waters or lands.
Encourage maritime-dependent facilities serving supply, support or transfer functions
level of deference for action taken under the state’s coastal management
plan.86 The court reached this conclusion in part because the plan had to be
approved by the Secretary of Commerce, and was implicitly approved by
Congress, thereby insulating it from a Commerce Clause attack.87  The court
also specifically noted that Congress had reauthorized the CZMA in 1976
“to help the States to deal with problems resulting from increased energy-
related activities in the coastal zone.”88  The court also noted that Congress
and the Secretary likely understood the choices states would be faced with
in balancing economic and environmental interests.89
B.  Massachusetts and Washington
Other states have also made effective use of the Consistency Provision.
In 1983, Massachusetts successfully had an injunction issued to stop the
sale of a lease for oil and gas development on the OCS.90  There, the
Secretary of Commerce made an initial determination that the lease sale was
in fact consistent with the Massachusetts coastal management plan, but
Massachusetts disagreed.91  Despite this disagreement, the Secretary
proceeded with the sale, and Massachusetts filed for a preliminary injunc-
tion.92  The State specifically argued that the lease sale was inconsistent
with “Policy 9” of its management program.93
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to locate in existing developed ports.
b. Evaluate indigenous or alternative sources of energy (coal, wind, solar and tidal
power) and offshore mining to minimize adverse impacts on the marine environment,
especially with respect to fisheries, water quality, and wildlife, and on the recreational
values of the coast.
Id.
94. Id. at 575.  The court also stated that “the legislative history of the Act indicates that
a broad definition of ‘direct effect’ was intended by Congress.”  Id.
95. Id. at 576. 
96. Id.
97. See Louisiana v. Lujan, 777 F. Supp. at 489.  “In support of [the claim that the sale
is inconsistent with the state’s coastal management plan] . . . plaintiffs put forward some
convincing testimony that the lease-sale could have significant environmental impacts on
Louisiana, specifically the coastal wetlands. . . . Such evidence is, however, insufficient to
meet plaintiff’s burden.”  Id.   Also of interest in the Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt
opinion is the court’s note that “[t]he resources, if they are there, will remain intact.  The
technology, both as to resource extraction and as to environmental preservation, can only
improve.”  560 F. Supp. at 582.  The court was referring to the fact that the lease of the OCS
rights was only the first step in a long process perhaps ultimately leading to the development
of oil and gas wells.  Id. A fortiori, the slight delay encountered by the Secretary in
formulating a more thorough consistency determination does not pose a significant threat
to the stated Congressional objective of developing energy interests.  Id.
98. Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 937 (9th Cir. 1988).
The court agreed and made several strong statements in support of the
CZMA and the Massachusetts coastal zone management law.  Specifically,
the court “recognize[d] that a wide range of uses and concerns come within
purview of the Act.”94  Here, Massachusetts made a determination that over
100 tracts would need to be deleted from the lease sale, among other
requirements, to make it consistent with state law.95  The Secretary
neglected to adopt all of these measures leading the court to note “[i]t is
plain from the language of the Act and regulations that the burden of
establishing compliance with a state program is on the federal agency
proposing the contemplated action, and not on the state.”96  This language
runs contrary to language in the Louisiana v. Lujan decision.97  Does this
suggest a less hospitable environment for consistency challenges to succeed
in Louisiana?  Perhaps, but it is difficult to make such a conclusion when
the state has failed to sufficiently exercise its power in the first place.  The
utter lack of litigation history surrounding the CZMA in Louisiana is
confounding, especially given the relative abundance of decisions in other
states with arguably less vital interests in the coastal zone.
Washington’s administration of its coastal management plan has also
proven effective.  A private plaintiff there successfully used the Washington
Shoreline Management Act to enjoin the Navy from building a homeport
in the state until the permitting process was complete.98  Friends of the
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99. Id. at 928.
100. Id. at 935.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.  “The [WSMA] states as one purpose ‘protecting against adverse effect to . . . the
waters of the state and their aquatic life . . . . Uses shall be preferred which are consistent
with control of pollution.’”  Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1988)).  The court
also pointed to a regulation implementing the act, requiring local governments to minimize
the environmental impact of dredging.  Id. (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE  173-16-060(16)(a)
(1988)).
104. Id. at 936.
105. Id.  “Therefore, the dredging and water quality regulations of the [WSMA] and the
Navy’s permit apply to the Navy’s construction of the Everett homeport, regardless of
whether that activity occurs on federal or non-federal lands.” Id.
106. Id. (citing California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 594
(1987)).  Most intriguing about this case is the fact that a private plaintiff was able to utilize
language from the state coastal management plan to prevent harm to the state’s waters.  The
reason it worked out this way was because the WSMA required the Washington Department
Earth, among others, argued that by commencing construction on the home-
port prior to the conclusion of the permitting process, the Navy had violated
provisions of the Washington Shoreline Management Act (WSMA).99  The
Navy argued three points regarding the alleged WSMA violation.  First,
counsel for the Navy argued that the WSMA was not a state program
“control[ling] the discharge of dredged or filled materials,” a designation
that requires compliance with state regulations under the Clean Water
Act.100  Second, the Navy argued that it was immune from suit under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity because the WSMA “is essentially a land
use law implementing the state’s Coastal Zone Management Program, for
which there has not been a waiver of sovereign immunity.”101  Finally, the
Navy also argued that the permit process for the WSMA was redundant.102
The Ninth Circuit disposed of these arguments by first noting that the
WSMA does in fact regulate and control “dredging and water quality within
Washington’s shoreline area.”103  To address the sovereign immunity argu-
ment, the court made an interesting distinction.  If the Navy successfully
characterized the WSMA as seeking to regulate land use, it would be
immune from suit because the activity was taking place on federal lands.104
However, the court reasoned that because the statute did not “mandate any
particular use of the land,” the federal lands exception did not apply.105
From there, it was a short leap of reasoning to dispose of the final argument
regarding duplication of process.  The court held that “because land use
regulation and environmental regulation are distinguishable, there is not
necessarily duplication when a state statute requires an environmental
permit, merely because one is also required by a federal agency.”106  The
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of Ecology to review the permit application after its initial issuance by the city where the
homeport would be built.  When it did so, it added additional conditions, one of which
allowed for review of the permit by the Shorelines Hearings Board pursuant to the WSMA.
This allowed Friends of the Earth to file a request for review, and when the Navy began
negotiating a construction contract for the port, it violated the law.  See generally id. at 930.
107. Id. at 928.  The method the Navy proposed for disposing of the dredged materials was
not sufficiently tested and may have resulted in the release of harmful metals and other
pollutants into the marine environment.  Id.
108. See, e.g., Mark Schleifstein, Permits May be Erosion Fighter; State Could Block Oil
and Gas Drilling, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 17, 2004, at National 9.  
[S]uch a move could be politically risky.  It might also backfire in Washington if
Louisiana is viewed as using the permits to extort financial aid, even with clear
evidence that offshore operations have damaged the state’s environment . . . . Florida
and California have used the provision for years to block oil exploration off their
shores.  But experts say it takes more than the state simply declaring that offshore
drilling is inconsistent . . . those states also had political power to back up their
complaints, both as substantial voting blocs in Congress and electoral votes in
presidential elections.
Id.
109. The Fifth Amendment states: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  
case may serve as an example of how far the language of the CZMA can be
pushed by public and private actors.  Here, the Navy had already jumped
through several regulatory hoops, but was still thwarted from engaging in
an activity that would have resulted in unknown environmental conse-
quences in Puget Sound.107  With the environmental diversity and
productivity associated with Louisiana’s coastal zone, it would not seem to
be an ideological stretch to expect the state to engage in similar consistency
determinations.  Why it was necessary for a private plaintiff to take action
here is unclear—Washington’s CMP likely allows private actors to appeal
consistency determinations.  This might be a method utilized by the state to
shift costs, another potential solution for Louisiana to take into account.
VI. LOUISIANA REVISITED: LEVEES IN THE PATH OF CHANGE
Several potential obstacles will confront the state if it chooses to use its
Consistency Provision more aggressively.  Predictably, there will be
resistance from the oil and gas industries, requiring political backbone from
state government.108  In addition, the issue of a Fifth Amendment
unconstitutional taking by means of excessive regulation is ever present.109
The Takings Provision is intended to prevent private individuals from
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110. Archer & Stone, supra note 68, at 100.  Archer and Stone discuss the proposition of
“regulatory takings,” where regulation goes “too far,” thus effecting a taking.  Id. at 101
(citing Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
111. See also Archer & Stone, supra note 68, at 101-108 (providing a concise summary
of the Supreme Court’s takings analysis following Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992)); see also Martin, supra note 24, at 1108-09:
Given the scope of destruction in the wetlands, the emergency nature of the situation,
and the relatively well-accepted causal relationship which exists between dredging
and land loss in the coastal zone, it does not seem likely that Louisiana will have any
problem demonstrating to the courts a strong nexus between the more stringent
regulation of dredging and other activities that damage the wetlands and the
legitimate state interest of literally preserving its physical being.
Id.
112. Lynn S. Sletto, Piecemeal Legislative Proposals: An Inappropriate Approach to
Managing Offshore Oil Drilling, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 557, 568 (2003).
Due to the perception that the current Administration maintains a “pro-drilling”
attitude, coupled with the appointment of a Secretary of Interior who admits
supporting the elimination of the current temporary offshore oil leasing moratoriums,
politicians from several coastal states have vigorously responded to attempts made
by the administration to conduct offshore oil drilling.
Id. at 567-68.
113. See State, Chevron Battle Over Offshore Wells, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 5, 2000,
at D3.  Chevron, specifically, has characterized Florida’s administration of the law a “blatant
misuse.”  Chevron contends that oil and gas production is in the national interest and would
do no harm to Florida’s coast.  Id.
bearing a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole.110  Here the
governmental interest at stake, coupled with the fact that rarely will a
property be completely devoid of value, likely suggest that a takings
challenge would not succeed—especially in hurricane ravaged Louisiana.111
The political and physical environment in Louisiana is primed for the
change advocated.  Courts in other jurisdictions have consistently sustained
actions of state coastal management agencies in regulating activities
affecting the coastal zone—even if those effects may be attenuated.  From
a purely legislative standpoint, no changes are required—the coastal
management program agencies simply need to make a substantial shift in
administering the powers already granted by the Act.      
In addition, the so-called “Seaweed Rebellion” is in full effect across
a range of coastal states.  Several states have legislation pending to
strengthen their ability to repel OCS drilling.112  In recent years, Florida has
faced strong opposition from the oil and gas industry in its efforts to prevent
OCS drilling in its coastal zone.  Industry officials have referred to the state
as “obstructionist” and “irrational” but state officials have been steadfast in
their assertion that OCS drilling would be inconsistent with Florida’s
coastal environmental protection scheme.113  Oil and gas industry lobbyists
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114. See Tamara Lytle, Florida Drilling Battles Not Over: The Oil Industry Wants to Take
Away the State’s Power to Fight Offshore Rigs , ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 10, 2002, at A1.
Interestingly, President Bush’s own brother, Governor Jeb Bush, has remained opposed to
drilling off the Florida coast.  He has publicly stated that any drilling could potentially cause
“environmental damage to Florida’s beaches and ruin the tourism-based economy.”  Id.
115. Id.  The energy industry is obviously a powerful political voice, but so far the rights
given to the states by the CZMA have not been weakened.  One commentator notes, “[t]hese
are multinational corporations more powerful than some countries, and they can’t stand the
fact that a little state government can stop them from doing what they want to do . . . .”  Id.
Florida occasionally points to Louisiana as an example of what will happen if the state’s
right to assert the consistency provision is weakened.  An op-ed piece in the Tampa Tribune
notes:
The dangers drilling poses to Florida’s tourist-based economy were illustrated
recently in Louisiana, where the industry likes to boast that offshore drilling has done
no harm.  In fact, the oil business has helped make a mess of the Pelican State’s
environment.  Canals dug to support offshore operations have contributed to
widespread erosion and a dangerous loss of coastline.  Toxins contaminate many
waters.
Louisiana Pipe Break Points Up Risks of Offshore Drilling, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE, Apr. 16,
2002, at Nation/World 10. 
116. Mitigation can be problematic as well because, obviously, not every community has
a land bank or area that can be restored comparably to the one that is being destroyed.
Furthermore, where the permitting process can take up to a decade, developers may be less
willing to cooperate in meeting mitigation requests.  See, e.g., Sandra Barbier, Plan for
have referred to the act as “nothing more than red tape,” and documents
made public in 2002 show that President Bush’s energy task force was
deluged with documents advocating the weakening of the CZMA.114  The
Act has been a valuable resource for the state, and has prevented possibly
“hundreds of rigs up and down the coast of Florida . . . .”115  Unfortunately,
the same cannot be said for Louisiana.  The state should alter its current
course and no longer allow development interests, short-term financing
issues, or political battles to keep it from administering its CMP in the most
effective manner possible.
VII. CONCLUSION
Clearly, there is room for improvement in Louisiana’s use of the CZMA
and its Consistency Provision.  Apart from the obvious need to utilize the
Act to keep more harmful development from ever commencing, the state
could also impose more stringent conditions when it does choose to issue
permits and licenses.  There is evidence to suggest that this has occurred in
other states, making use of the Act more effective.  Some pollution,
dredging, and new industry may be inevitable—but the manner in which it
occurs is in the hands of state regulators.  More demanding mitigation116
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Wetlands Landfill Growth Advances: Firm Wins Approval of Parish Council, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Nov. 14, 2003, at Metro 1.
117. Louisiana is not blind to the fact that it is producing energy resources benefiting the
entire country at the expense of its coastline.  In regards to using the consistency provision
more aggressively, Mark Davis, Director of the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana,
notes:
We would be putting forth the true proposition that if this country is going to
legitimately develop its energy resources, it has to do so in a way that recognizes its
impacts on the areas that service that production . . . . This nation’s energy policy
must adequately recognize the impacts that states, and particularly, Louisiana, have
suffered on behalf of this nation in the course of producing an abundance of oil and
gas. 
Schleifstein, supra note 108.
requirements or more careful environmental analysis could be extracted
from developers.  It is also apparent, from examining the implementation
of the CZMA in other states, that courts have been willing to grant broad
authority to state regulators in the interest of protecting scarce coastal
resources, even at the expense of industry.  Energy development is
important for national security, but as at least one court has noted that if the
resources are there, they will remain there.  What will be much more expen-
sive to repair is the current destruction occurring in Louisiana’s coastal zone
as barrier islands erode, coastlines recede, and wetlands fill.117  The
potential exists for billions of dollars to be lost in commercial fishery
interests, recreation, and infrastructure.
Other states have found success when pushing the language of the Act
to its outermost limits.  While examples are limited, so are the alternatives.
State legislation that would simply ban OCS drilling or other
environmentally detrimental coastal zone activities detracts from the goal
of uniformity enhanced by the CZMA.  Other legislative tools, such as the
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), do not provide the state
with the same type of power.  NEPA may be effective when used in concert
with the CZMA, but cannot alone do the heavy lifting involved in
protecting the coastal zone.  
Louisiana cannot abuse the Act, especially given the pro-energy
development slant of the Bush administration, and a proposed rule that
could theoretically curtail state power under the Act.  However, Congress
has continued to show support for broad state action and discretion under
the Act, and appears poised to continue to do so.   The state merely needs
to pursue a more aggressive approach.  
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118. See id.
119. Id. “I see it as part of a master plan to apply pressure . . . . We’re not going to receive
any kind of concessions from the federal government unless we stand up and assert that this
is having a terrible effect on the coast.”  Id.  In 1991, when then Governor Buddy Roemer
attempted to utilize the Consistency Provision to block a lease sale, he was outmaneuvered





123. See Bruce Alpert, Threat to Block Offshore Leases No Sure Thing: Blanco’s Bid For
Coastal Cash May Be Ignored, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 16, 2006, at National 6.
124. See id.  The state is seeking a fifty-fifty split of the revenue generated for the federal
government by oil and gas production off Louisiana’s shore.  Currently, the state receives
only a fraction of that revenue; it is estimated that the state received only $32 million of the
$5.7 billion taken in by the federal government.
A. What Next?  How Louisiana Might Go About Changing its Approach
There is some evidence that Louisiana has considered stepping up the
assertion of its rights under the Act.  Both previous and current Louisiana
governors have suggested as much, but have apparently lacked the political
will or resources to do so.118  Law professors within the state advocate for
a more aggressive use of the provision as well.119  Unfortunately, the
perception of Louisiana’s state government appears to be that the provision
should be used merely as a bargaining tool, forcing the federal government
to “direct a share of royalties to reconstruction and conservation efforts.”120
This perception may also be responsible for the State’s failures in litigation
surrounding the CZMA, as the State has not sufficiently tied the effects of
OCS drilling to coastal erosion and pollution.121  However, that evidence is
now strikingly clear, with one study finding that “onshore and offshore oil
and gas exploration and production are responsible for more than 33 percent
of the direct and indirect wetlands loss in Louisiana.”122
During the writing of this Comment, Louisiana asserted its authority
under the CZMA, threatening to block oil and gas lease sales until the state
receives a larger share of federal funds to restore its hurricane battered
coastline.123  Once again, however, the focus is on getting money out of the
federal government, rather than simply using the powers the Act grants to
the state to more effectively manage its coastline.124  When the focus is
placed on financial aspects, the credibility of the state is limited and it is
less likely that the state would succeed in litigation over an assertion of the
provision.  According to a representative of the American Petroleum
Institute, “oil producers are getting nervous about the governor’s threat and
hope Congress and the administration will reach agreement on sharing
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125. Id.
126. Governor Blanco seems to be following through on her threats to make use of the
Consistency Provision to block a controversial sale of oil and gas leases in the eastern Gulf
of Mexico.  She has said, “[m]ake no mistake, [blocking the sales] is not an idle threat . . . .
For the first time in more than a decade, we are seeing signs of movement on this issue.”
Pam Radtke Russell, Offshore Drilling Meetings to Start: La. Could Restate Lease-Sale
Threat, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 28, 2006, at Money 1.
revenue.”125  Discouraging as the impetus for Louisiana’s action may be, if
it opens the state’s eyes to the potential benefits of the Act, the standoff
with the federal government may be worthwhile.  In any event, the
controversy may signal a positive trend in the state’s progression.  One
potential concern, however, is that if Louisiana does not utilize the
Consistency Provision appropriately, i.e., in situations where it is truly
warranted, Congress may be tempted to limit state authority under the Act
in the future.  As previously noted, however, the political environment for
this type of assertion by Louisiana is sufficiently ripe for action, given the
epic destruction the coastal zone has faced.  If Louisiana does continue to
pursue this course of action, and it appears that it may,126 it would stand to
lose many of the direct and indirect economic benefits brought to the state
by the oil and gas industry.  What it might gain are concessions from the
federal government in terms of additional funds for coastal restoration.  One
drawback to this approach, however, is the implication that Louisiana will
eventually sign off on the leases, once the state gets its financial due.  If this
is the case, the Consistency Provision will have merely been used as a
means of extortion, not as a means to protect the environment by preventing
harmful activities in the coastal zone.
Alternatively, the state could declare future lease sales inconsistent and
extract environmental concessions (to make the activities consistent with
the state CMP) from companies wishing to go forward with drilling
operations in the Gulf.  With oil profits at record highs, this does not seem
unreasonable.  Furthermore, it redirects the burden Louisiana is seeking to
place on the federal government in the scenario noted above onto the
shoulders of the wealthy oil and gas industry.  In this scenario, the potential
exists that companies would simply avoid bidding on lease sales in the Gulf
because of the increased cost associated with making any proposed
exploration consistent.  Any economic benefits lost as a result of a develop-
ment such as this could ultimately be regained through increased property
values as a result of coastal restoration, more emphasis on tourism and
fisheries production, and, theoretically, increased revenues when oil and gas
are ultimately extracted from the floor of the ocean at some point in the
future.
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127. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.30, 49:214.35 (2005).  “Any person adversely
affected by an activity, including private citizens and environmental groups, is entitled to
judicial review of final permit decisions.”  Livaudais, supra note 33, at 1033.
Another consideration for the state is amending the language of its
CMP to more directly address particular geographic areas or particular
activities of concern.  The state might single out particularly sensitive areas,
or cite specific activities such as dredging and drilling that will be subject
to heightened scrutiny under the state’s CMP.  While this would require
approval from the Secretary of Commerce, it might give the state stronger
footing in future litigation battles, should it choose to assert its power under
the Consistency Provision more aggressively.  The Act also contains a
provision for citizen suits, which could be asserted by private individuals
or groups “adversely affected” by a permit decision.127  This has not been
a common course of action in the state thus far, nor has it been in other
states with similar provisions.
The Act is essentially a nationwide coastal zoning plan and should be
perceived by the state as such.  To analogize to local zoning plans, when a
particular use is harmful to a community, it is limited to specific areas,
ameliorated, or eliminated altogether.  Congress gave this broad authority
to the states with the CZMA and it has affirmed that delegation several
times in the history of the legislation.  Arguably, Louisiana’s administration
of the CZMA has been in direct conflict with congressional intent, and
Congress has no authority under the Act to force Louisiana into action.
Where Congress intended to give states the power to repel federal activities
that were inconsistent with the states approved management plans,
Louisiana has instead utilized the powerful provision merely as an attempt
to secure additional funding.  Again and again, through over thirty years of
amendments, reauthorizations, and judicial decisions, the potential strength
of the Act has been affirmed.  Throughout this period, oil and gas explora-
tion, canal dredging, and coastal erosion have continued almost unabated.
In other coastal states, notably California, Florida, and Delaware, the Act
has been utilized as intended, giving states a voice over powerful govern-
ment and industry interests.  While California and Florida can point to
stronger delegations in Congress and better financial resources as reasons
for their success, states such as Delaware and Washington cannot.
Nevertheless, they have utilized the Act just as effectively.
The time has come for Louisiana to put a stop to the wholesale
destruction of its coastline by asserting its delegated authority under the
Consistency Provision of the CZMA.  For now, the energy resources will
perhaps remain buried in the Gulf.  Obstacles including financial con-
straints, political roadblocks, and some negative judicial precedent certainly
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exist.  While difficult to overcome, the state has perhaps its strongest
incentive ever for doing so and may hope to abate the loss of thousands of
acres of valuable coastline and wetlands, not only sustaining property
values, but also perhaps lessening the blow of the next Katrina.
